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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

LOYE E. MARTINDALE, DARWIN W.
LARSEN, CAROL W. CLAY;
LOGAN CITY, a Municipal
Corporation; and the MUNICIPAL
COUNCIL OF LOGAN CITY,
PETITION FOR
REHEARING

Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
vs.

Supreme Court No. 15498

MAYOR DESMOND L. ANDERSON,
CITY ATTORNEY J. BLAINE
ZOLLINER, CITY AUDITOR AND
BUDGET DIRECTOR DUANE A.
BECK,
Defendants and
Appellants

---0000000---

To the Honorable Chief Justice and the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court of Utah:
The Respondents present this petition for a rehearing
of the above cause and, in support thereof, respectfully shew:
1.

The appeal in the cause was argued before this

Court on May 9th, 1978.
2.

On July 13, 1978, this Court rendered its decision

in favor of the Appellants and against the Respondents reversing
the judgment of the District Court in part.
3.

Respondents seek a rehearing upon the following

grounds:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a.

THE OPINION OF JUSTICE HALL DENIED RESPONDENTS DUE PROCESS
OF LAW IN THAT:
"Issues" and "facts" beyond those properly before

the trial court and improper and untrue were accepted by the
opinion without opportunity for hearing, presentation of
evidence or cross examination of witnesses or "extraneous
circumstances" of "legislative history and intent."

b.

THE OPINION OF JUSTICE HALL IS UNSUPPORTED AND INACCURATE
IN THAT
It inaccurately characterizes rules of interpretatioo

employed in Federal-State separation of power models and makes
unsupported conclusions about substantive allocations of power
in those models.

For the foregoing reasons, it is urged that this
petition be granted.
Dated:

August 1, 1978
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Counsel for Respondent'

I hereby certify that the foregoing~tition is submitted in

(f\
~µ_. ' ~ ~ ·o/., 94.L--''

good faith and not for purpo'e' o f e l y . ,
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Counsel for Respondent·,

-3NATURE OF THE CASE AND DISPOSITION
This is a Petition for Rehearing on this Court's
decision filed on the 13th day of July, 1978 as written by
Mr. Justice Hall.

The scope of the requested rehearing is

limited to that portion of the decision which reverses the
trial court's Summary Declaratory Judgment involving the
interpretation and application of statutes related to the
Council-Mayor Optional Form of Municipal Government.

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON REHEARING
Pursuant to their Petition, the petitioners seek
the following relief:
First, that the Court issue a new opinion sustaining the trial courts Declaratory Summary Judgment in its
entirety in accord with dissent of Justice Crockett or
failing that;
Second, remand the case to the trial court on a
finding of ambiguity or doubtfulness of the statutes with
instructions to receive proper evidence of "extraneous
circumstances" to aid in the interpretation of the statutes.
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-4STATEMENT OF FACTS
The substantive "facts" as they relate to this
petition for rehearing (on Point II) were as they are
established in the record of the trial court in the transcM;
verified and unverified pleadings, affidavits, and documents
and no new statement thereof is material to this petition

~

re'.1earing.
The p_£ocedural "facts" that relate to Point I are
that :'."'ie trial court interpreted and applied
Optio~al
ori:-;iar~·

the Council-!·1 2

Form of Municipal Government Act on the basis of
rules of construction, and was not urged by any part

nor did it determine that the act was ambiguous or of doubt!'.
mea~i~g

was

c~

or application to the issues before the court.

It

this basis that Appellants lodged their appeal.

No

par:y ,including amicus curiae) has asked for nor has this
Court determined that the Act was ambiguous or of doubtful
meaning or application to this case.
The following matters bearing on interpretation we:
interposed on appeal for the first time in an unsworn petiti:
and trief signed by Melvin Leslie, Steven W. Allred and
Jerrald D. Conder, as legal counsel "representing" three
legislators, amicus curiae.

Those "new" matters were their

subjective understanding of legislative intent; claimed
linkages between intent in the repealed Strong-Mayor Act
and the Act in question and general "legislative history."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-5This appearance of Amicus Curiae was objected
to on motion before the Supreme Court to allowing their
appearances on the grounds that it attempted to introduce
"new facts'' and the Chief Justice stated that their
appearance could not introduce "new facts."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-6BRIEF

POINT I

2.

THE OPINION OF JUSTICE HALL DENIED RESPONDENTS

PROCEDU~

DUE PROCESS IN REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT.
The opinion of Justice Hall erred by invading the
province of the trial court and resorted for the first

ti~

on appeal to "extrinsic circumstances" to interpret a
legislative enactment without first determining an
existed.

ambigui~

All the parties submitted this matter to the trial

court for "Summary Judgment" on the basis that the court
could determine the interpret a ti on of the law wi thont resort
to extrinsic facts and the trial court so ruled.
No party at the S:..imrH:"'J' J:..idgment level alleged or
attempted to introduce testimony that the statutes were
ambiguous or of doubtful meaning as applied to the issues
presented.
There is no pleading, document, affidavit that was
before the trial court or anything other than the unsworn
briefs before the Supreme Court alleging or claiming in any
way that the Council-Mayor Optional Form of Government Act
was either ambiguous or of doubtful meaning or any other
similar claim as those laws applied to the issues before t~
trial court.

The trial court made no such finding of

ambiguity or doubtful meaning either expressly or impliedly,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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-7and the trial court then properly ruled in Summary Judgment
on the issues based on the primary rule that statutes are
interpreted according to the legislative intent as expressed
in the law, as interpreted in accordance with well accepted
cannons of statutory construction.
The trial court would have erred had it in fact
inquired into "extrinsic circumstances" unless, first, some
party had claimed the applicable statutes ambiguous or of
doubtful meaning or application and, second, the trial court
had found affirmatively that they were ambiguous or of
doubtful meaning.

Neither condition was met.

Any inquiry beyond the expressions of the act and
into "extraneous circumstances" are to be prefaced by the
strong caveat of a finding of "ambiguity or doubtfulness."
The meaning to be ascribed to a statute can
only be derived from a considered weighing
of every relevant aid to construction. In
some cases, the true meaning of an ambiguous
statute may be found from extraneous
circumstances. For this purpose, it has
been regarded as proper for courts to resort
to, or take judicial notice of, facts or
events, of common knowledge reasonably
within the scope of judicial cognizance.
However, conjectures aliunde are not sufficient
for this purpose.
It is clearly improper to
resort to extrinsic circumstances where the
statute is plain and unambiguous.

73 Am Jur 2nd Statutes §147.
A federal case in the Fourth Circuit succinctly

pinpoints the gross fallacy of the opinion of Justice Hall
as it wanders aimlessly into forbidden and erroneous
"extraneous circumstances."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-8When the meaning of a law is evident, to go
elsewhere in search of conjecture in order
to ~estrict or extend the act would be an
att~mpt to elude it, a method which, if
once admitted, would be exceedingly dangerous, since there would be no law, however
definite and precise in its language, which
might not by interpretation be rendered
useless.
Re Boggs-Rice Co.

(CA4) 66 F2d 855.

The citations in the Memorandum of Amicus Curiae
in support of Petition to Intervene clearly establish this
same principle.

Thus in Utah this Court has determined that

a condition precedent to delving into "history" and "purpose'
is a finding first that the legislation's interpretation is
doubtful or uncertain.
The Petition of Amicus Curiae to Intervene clearly
establishes a critical point that would otherwise require M
examination of the record in the trial court to discover.
Their avowed purpose in intervenirg was

5.

That the legislative intent and history
of aforesaid legislation have not been
fully presented to the lower Court and
such information may be of assistance in
this Court's deliberations.

Petition at p. 2.
This statement correctly reflects the status of
the record.

No one claimed "ambiguity" or "doubtfulness"

and the tri~l court properly relied on the primary rule of
interpreting the act and its intent from its wording and t~
necessary implications of that wording.

Counsel for the

Amicus Curiae (who should of all be most familiar with rules
of statutory interpretation) implies that the trial court
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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-9should have wandered into those clearly forbidden paths by
inquiring into "history" and the "subjective intent of three
legislators."
The offense to justice was further compounded when
Respondents specifically objected orally before this court to
Amicus Curiae appearing for the purposes stated in their
petition and were assured by Mr. Chief Justice Ellett in
that hearing that the Court was sufficiently perceptive to
disregard such matters and would only consider legal arguments
based upon facts in the trial court record.
But contrary to the rule of law, procedural due
process and the express assurances of this Court, the opinion
of Justice Hall adopts facts and rests its conclusion on
those improper "extraneous circumstances" and "historical
conjectures" introduced in the briefs of Amicus Curiae and
Appellant.
Citations from the Opinion:
Three state legislators also appear as amici
curiae for the avowed purpose of informing
the Court as to the legislative intent in
enacting the Act.
Opinion of Justice Hall at p. 2.
In order to place the issues pr~sented by
this appeal in proper perspective it is
helpful to trace the structural development
of municipal government in Utah.
Opinion of Justice Hall at p. 2.
It was from that legislation (Strong Mayor Act)
that the initial legislative intent clearly
emerged to provide an optional form of
municipal government framed in the image of
the federal and state systems.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Opinion of
JusticeLibrary
Hall
p. 2.Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Servicesat
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-10In 1975 the Legislature repealed the Strong
Mayor Form of Government Act and enacted
substantially similar provisions in the Act
upon which this appeal focuses.
The legislative intent remained clear to provide
variations in the traditional forms of
government consistent with present day needs
as is evidenced by the following observation
inserted as a preface to the Act:
Opinion of Justice Hall, at p. 2.
We are of the opinion that the trial judge
placed undue emphasis on that portion of the
Act which declared the Council to be the
"governing body." His disinclination to
construe all of the provisions of the Act in
the light of the definition of that term, as
set forth in the Act, caused him to draw
erroneous conclusions and thus misinterpret
the law.
When the Act is read in its entirety, and ea~
provision thereof is read in context with all
of the others and when viewed in the light of
the legislative history of municipal governrne~
in Utah, we are compelled to conclude that it
in fact provides for the absolute separation of
executive and legislative powers.
A fortiori,
the 1977 modifications to the Act specifically
vest the whole of the executive powers in the
Mayor and only the legislative powers in the
Council, and we consequently hold that the
council-mayor form of government as adopted by
Logan City is a true separation of powers form
of government.
Opinion of Justice Hall, at p.

6.

The opinion of Justice Hall on its face is a clear
acknowledgment that it "viewed in the light of the legislativ
history (introduced by conjecture), of municipal government
in Utah"

and but for that it would have sustained the trial

court's decision which was based on the interpretation of the
"four corners of the law."
Even had the above cited conjecture been a correct
statement of historical fact, the injury to procedural due
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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-11process would have been substantial for the procedure
employed denies Respondents their right to present evidence,
cross-examine witnesses and have review on appeal limited
to factual issues tried in the lower court.
But here there is a more substantive injury;
those same "legally irrelevant historical facts and
conjectures" are in fact historically wrong as evidenced by
the attached affidavits of the Honorable Senator Bullen and
the Honorable Representative Gardner.
The explicit conjecture that the divisions provided
in the repealed strong-mayor form of government were "intended"
to be "substantially similar" to those provided in the Council
Mayor form is disputed in the sworn affidavit of Senator
Bullen.

Such a conjecture is unfounded in light of the true

history.

The true course of events could only lead one to the

exact opposite conclusion.

The facts as revealed by the

Bullen affidavit are:
1.

Rejection by a majority of Logan City electorate

in 1973 in a referendum of the Strong Mayor Form of
Government.
2.

Repeal by the Legislature primarily because of

the Logan electorate's rejection of the substance of that
Strong Mayor Act.
3.

Adoption of Council-Mayor Form by the 1975

Legislature to overcome the substantive objections of Logan's
electorate to the repealed Strong-Mayor Form.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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4.

The subsequent acceptance by majority of Logan':

electorate of the Council-Mayor Form in a referendum.
The correct and true history does not support the
opinion of Justice Hall that there was no substantive
between the two acts.

dif~~

A comparison of the power vesting

and definition provisions of the repealed Strong-Mayor forn
and the Council-Mayor Form also belie the conclusions in the
opinion of Justice Hall.

Also attached hereto is an affidavit of one of the
so-called amicus curiae which exemplifies the result of a
denial of due process.

The Honorable Representative Willard

Hale Gardner one of the three (legislator) witnesses who
according to the opinion of Justice Hall concurred in
"declaring legislative intent," but in fact, who never filed
so much as an affidavit or even a bare signed statement as tc
what his intent was, counters and re,j ects the reading of
legislative intent presented in the Brief bearing his name
and relied upon by the Court.

Mr. Gardner claims that it

was his understanding and that of the legislature that the
Council would have the powers attributed by the Court to

t~

Mayor as they pertained to buying and selling real property
and approving subdivisions and zoning in general.

The re suit

of a denial Of due process is to have that man's views
represented to this court without so much as his knowledge
that he or his name is being used therefore.

I t becomes

clear why due process requires a hearing, confrontation of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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-13witnesses, opportunity for cross-examination, etc., in the
introduction of evidence.

The opinion of Justice Hall in

accepting this evidence indicates the result of a palpable
denial of due process.

Evidence which is not evidence and

which does not exist has found its way into the opinion of
Justice Hall.

By this precipitous meandering into "extraneous

circumstances" on appeal under the guise of some spurious
notion of judicial notice, Respondents have been denied due
process.
Respondents are continuing to examine other legislators
and walk that endless and costly path of dubious legality
in search of evidence pursuant to "secondary rules of
construction."

Respondents now have substantial reason to

believe that the opinion of Mr. Justice Hall with regard to
legislative intent and its conclusions is not in harmony
with the views of the other two legislator witnesses as
those views would be expressed in cross examination in a
trial court.

Respondents know that innumerable legislator-

witnesses could be called who would repudiate the conclusions.
This is a clear case of judicial legislation,
accomplished at the expense of Respondent's due process
guarantees, in violation of the United States Constitution
and the Constitution of the State of Utah.
Of course the whole bailiwick ought to be off
limits until ambiguity is affirmatively found.

It is clear

that any principle allowing consideration of the above cited

..
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-14conjectures by legislators or about legislation is dependent
on the Court's initial determination that the statute is
doubtful or ambiguous.

American Jurisprudence Second discus:

the general rules respecting "extraneous circumstances"
finding that it is only appropriate for the "interpretation
of ambiguous language," "where the meaning of the words used
is doubtful, etc.

Statutes §§ 148, 150.

Moreover, the legislative history of a
statute may not comDel a construction
at variance with its plain words, and
where the language of a statute is unambiguous, consideration of the history
of the legislation is not permissible.
Although it has been declared that the
legislative history of an act becomes
imoortant only in extremely doubtful matters
of interpretation.
Statutes §151 (Footnotes omitted - emphasis added).
As to the evidence which may be used of these
"extraneous circumstances" there are significant restrictions
The opinions
testimony of
intention of
statute, may
Statutes

§

of individual legislators, or the
a member of the legislature as to the
the legislature in enacting a
not be given consideration.

169 (Footnotes omitted).

Apart from ooinions expressed in debates, the
actual proceedings of the legislature, or the
steps taken in the enactment of a law, or the
history of the passage of the law through the
legislature, may be resorted to as an a~d in the
interpretation of a statute.
However, there is
contrary authority; moreover, it has been said
that only in extremely doubtful matters of
interpretation does the legislative history of
an act of Congress become important.
Of course,
there may be no resort to the le~islative h1sto~
of the enactment of a statute, the lan~uage of
which is plain and unambiguous, since such
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-15legislative history may only be resorted
to for the purpose of solving doubt, not for
the purpose of.creating it. By the same token,
it has been said that when statutory language
is explicit, legislative history simply
corroborates the obvious meaning of the
language used in the law
It is well settled that to ascertain legislative
intent in enacting a statute the language of
which is of doubtful or ambiguous imnort,
resort may be had to the journals or other
legislative records showing the history in
the legislature of the act in question while it
was in process of enactment.
Statute §170 (footnotes omitted).
It is noted here that the opinion of Justice Hall resorts to
legislative history without finding any ambiguity in the
statues and further has relied on improper evidence.

Respondents

note too that the doubt was created in the first place by
resort to improper evidence at the appellate court level.
The procedure used can be likened to an appeal
dealing with the application of the parol evidence rule where
the trial court rules on the meaning of a contract and its
application based upon a submission of the parties.

The trial

court reads the contract, gives it a proper "four corners
interpretation," there being no claim of uncertainty or
ambiguity and properly no resort by the trial court to
extrinsic parol evidence.

The losing party then appeals and

the appellate court at the suggestion of amicus curiae takes
"judicial notice" of hotly contested and highly questionable
"parol" or "extrinsic evidence" inadmissible in the trial
court and presented in an unsworn brief to interpret the
contract and overrule the trial court's "four corners"
interpretation.

This occurs on the appellate level without a
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-16suggestion of ambiguity or uncertainty or doubtfulness as
to the meaning of the contract.

There is no hearing, no

right to cross examine or confront witnesses, etc.

Add to

that mixture two sworn affidavits indicating the appellate
court is wrong about the parol facts.
The opinion of the Court clearly denied Respondent':
constitutional rights and violated accepted procedures as
follows:
1.

Rule 12-(4) of the Utah Rules of Evidence:
A judge or a reviewing court taking
judicial notice under paragraph (1)
or (3) of this rule of matter not theretofore
so noticed in the action shall afford the
parties reasonable opportunity to present
information relevant to the propriety of
taking such judicial notice and to the tenor
of the matter to be noticed.

2.

Article I, Section 7 of Constitution of the

State of Utah and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States in the following particulars:
(a) The right to have the appeal determined on the.
evidence and issues before the trial court and not arbitrarily:
Due process of law protects against arbitrary
action, consequently, arbitrary action by the
tribunal in the hearing of a cause or in its
order violates due process.
16 Am Jur 2nd Constitutional Law §576 (Footnotes omitted).
(b) The right to fundamental fairness in the use
of evidence.
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids fundamental unfairness in the use
of evidence, whether true or false.
It is an
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-17immutable principle of jurisprudence that
where governmental action seriously injures
an individual and the reasonableness of the
action depends on fact findings, the evidence
used to prove the government's case, documentary evidence and, even more important,
testimony, must be disclosed to the individual
so that he has the op~ortunity to show that it
is untrue. Due process implies the right to
contradict by proof every material fact which
bears on the question of right involved.
Moreover, the case against the party asserting
the protection of the due process guaranty must
be made out by proof, in the absence of a
default.
16 Am Jur 2nd Constitutional Law §578 (Footnotes omitted).
(c) The opportunity for hearing and cross examination
relative to "extraneous circumstances 11 or "legislative
history.

11

An opportunity for hearing is one of the essential
elements of due process.
16 Am Jur 2nd Constitutional Law §569 (Footnotes omitted).
(d) The right to raise issues and set up defenses
to "legislative history and subjective intent":
Due process requires that a party sought to be
affected by a proceeding shall have the right
to raise such issues or set up any defense which
he may have in the cause. Even if he has no
defense to the action, the fundamental law of
the land secures to him the right to be heard in
his own defense . . . .
Procedural due process often requires confrontation and cross-examination of those whose word
deprives a person of his livelihood.
16 Am Jur 2nd Constitutional Law §574 (Footnotes omitted).
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POINT II
2.

THE OPINION OF JUSTICE HALL IS UNSUPPORTED AND INACCURATE.
The opinion of Justice Hall found Logan's form of

government to be patterned upon the federal and state models
involving separation of powers:
He [the Mayor] further contends that this is
because the Act is patterned after the absolute
separation of powers doctrine set forth in the
federal and state constitutions.
With these
contentions we agree and reverse the ruling of
the trial court.
Hall Opinion at p. 1 [emphasis added].

The opinion's reason-

ing is amply displayed throughout.
It was from that legislation that the initial
legislative intent clearly emerged to provide
an optional form of municipal government framed
in the image of the federal and state systems.
Hall Opinion at p. 2 [emphasis added].
Helpful to such a determination is a definition
of executive and legislative powers.
Simply
stated, legislative powers are policy making
powers, while executive powers are policy
execution powers.
Hall Opinion at p.

6.

Interpretation of the Act is to be

based primarily on federal and state models involving

separ~

tion of powers and "helpful" to that interpretation are
definitions of "legislative" and "executive" powers.
Using this basis as the touchstone for

interpret~

tion, the Hall Opinion then applies its method of interpretation to the issue of whether the mayor [executive branch)
or the municipal council [legislative branch] has the poweI

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-19and authority to buy, sell or exchange real property concluding
as follows:
The policy-making powers reserved to the Council
clearly do not encompass decisions to buy or
sell property or to otherwise manage it . . . .
We consequently hold that the management of
city property, including its sale and purchase,
is an executive function reserved to the Mayor.
Hall Opinion at p. 6 [emphasis added].
What is truly clear in Justice Hall's opinion is
that there was no understanding of federal and state models.
The Constitution of the United States specifically provides
in Article IV, Section 3:
The Congress shall have the Power to dispose
of and make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the . . . property belonging to
the United States . .
Respondents have been unable to locate, despite diligent and
painstaking research, a single, solitary judicial decision or
legal commentary or treatise which holds other than that
Congress has the power to control United States' property
and that the President does not.

For everywhere the rule is

as stated in American Jurisprudence.
It (the legislature] not only has a legislative
power over the public domain, but it also
exercises the powers of the proprietor therein.
Congress may deal with such lands precisely as
a private individual may deal with his property,
and may sell or withhold them from sale.
63 Am Jur 2d, Public Lands §13 at

488 [footnotes omitted].

The rules cannot be more direct and clear:
Congress has both legislative and proprietary
powers with respect to the public domain
it may regulate the use and occupancy of the
public domain precisely as an individual may
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-20deal with and control his land.
The power
over the public domain intrusted to congress
by the Constitution is exclusive, plenary and
without limitations.
73 C.J.S.

Public Lands §3 at 649 [footnotes omitted].
Congress is vested by the Constitution with the
power of disposition of public lands.
The power
is without limitation and congress has the
absolute right to prescribe the times, the
conditions, and the mode of transferring this
property or any part of it, and to designate the
persons by whom, and to whom the transfer shall
be made.
The president has no right to dispose
of public lands under the Constitution.

73 C.J.S.

Public Lands §24 at 675 [footnotes omitted].

See also 73 C.J.S.

Public L~nds §§237, 238, 239.

The opinion fares no better with state constitutio:.
The Utah Constitution provides
The Public Institutions of the State are hereby
permanently located at the places hereinafter
named each to have the lands specifically
granted to it by the United States . . . to be
disposed of and used in such manner as the legislature may provide .
Art. XIX §2 [emphasis added].
All lands of the State that have been, or may
hereafter be granted to the State by Congress,
and all lands acquired by gift, grant or devise
from any person, or that may otherwise be
acquired, are hereby accepted, and declared to
be the public lands of the State; and shall be
held in trust for the people, to be disposed of
as provided by law
Art. XX §1 [emphasis added].

Clearly under Utah's ConstiW~

the legislature controls real property for it can only be
disposed of "as provided by law" and clearly the governor
does not make law.

Of course, the Congress of the United

States and the Legislature of the State of Utah have seen fi'.
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to delegate some portions of this authority to various boards
and officials.

Nevertheless without question the power and

authority to buy, sell and exchange real property belongs to
the legislative body in both federal and state models.

The

conclusion concerning real property in the opinion of Justice
Hall based on its own logic is unsupported and inaccurate.
The opinion of Justice Hall goes awry in sidestepping and ignoring the wording, of the statute itself,
rules of statutory construction and accepted methods of
interpreting power allocations in separated power, executivelegislati ve-j udi cial governments.

The opinion oversteps all

this to an assumed and perceived conception of the intent of
the legislature, a conception which itself is introduced for
the first time on appeal in an improper and highly prejudicial
manner.

The best indication of the quality of that conception

is the fact that the very legislator who is represented to
this Court as having that legislative intent and design is
now indicating directly to this Court by sworn affidavit that
his view was misrepresented, that he shares the opposite view
and that he was not the source of the facts presented therein.
See Affidavit of the Honorable Willard Hale Gardner,
attached hereto as Exhibit A.
The opinion of Justice Hall sidesteps the following
accepted rules of statutory construction:
1.

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius:

When a

legislature expressly enumerates powers, powers not given are
considered expressly withheld.

The opinion in construing

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-22mayoral powers does not follow this rule.

Opinion

of

Justice Hall at p. 6.
2.

Noscitur a socis:

Words should be inter-

preted in context, i.e., "executive powers" in context would
be considered those powers expressly given the Mayor in the
Act.

See Section io-3-1219(a) and 73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes

§213 at 407.
3.

Significance to be accorded every word:

The

opinion of Justice Hall ignores Section 10-3-1212 of the Act
where it says the municipal council is to consider "land
acquisition."
4.

Words presumed to have same meaning in statutes

on the same subject:

The opinion of Justice Hall finds

legislative body means one thing in the Act and something
else [the executive] in zoning and subdivision laws and
applies a similar methodology to use of "governing body" in
the Act and elsewhere in the Code.

See 73 Am Jur 2d,

Statutes §233 at 416.
5.

No legislative intent is presumed from

recodification:

The opinion of Mr. Justice Hall states the

Legislature made an "effort to clarify" and "deleted"
"governing body" from the Act in an admitted recodification.
Opinion of Justice Hall at 5.

This is contrary to all

settled rules of construction regarding recodifications.

SN

e.g., 76 Am Jur 2d, Statutes §324 at 472.
6.

No repeal by implication:

The opinion of

Justice Hall finds the Act by implication repeals and reorde:
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-23the entire municipal code with respect to power allocation.
See reasoning at page 7 in the opinion of Justice Hall with
respect to three separate subdivision laws.
to well settled laws of construction.

This is contrary

See 76 Am Jur 2d,

Statutes §§396, 400, 401 [noting that a repeal by implication
must be "clear, manifest, controlling, necessary, positive,
unavoidable, and irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy,"
such that the two acts cannot be reconciled and given effect],
§402 ["Moreover it has been held that there must be some
express reference to the previous statute"].

The opinion of

Justice Hall effects this repeal entirely by its definition
of "executive" in a general usage and applies that to longstanding, well established, detailed laws respecting
subdivision approval.

7.

See 76 Am Jur 2d Statutes §181.

Statutes are presumed harmonious and consistent:

As described, supra, in regard to repeal by implication, the
opinion of Justice Hall eschews the interpretation that would
make the Act consistent with other laws respecting municipal
government.
8.

Acts should be construed as a whole:

of Justice Hall rests not to

The opinion

the Act as a whole but on the

mere general usage of the words executive branch and legislative branch first appearing in a recodification.
9.

A repealed statute replaced by an entirely

reordered and changed statute is not indicative of legislative
intent:

The Strong Mayor Form of Government is entirely

dissimilar except in certain general descriptions, it also
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-24has express repealers, no enumeration of powers and does
not call the council "the governing body."
2d, Statutes §236.

See 76 Am Jur

Respondents urge first that there is a

shift evident from one act to the other, i.e., "Strong Mayor
Form of Government" to "Council-Mayor Form of Government" ar.:
second, th.at, in any event, the const:ruction placed on the
strong mayor law is itself erroneous.
10. Similar legislation in other states is ignored
The opinion of Justice Hall does not consider nor refer to
the interpretations in numerous other states which have
adopted similar legislation.

See Respondents Brief at pp.

19-22.
11. Confusion should be avoided.

Interpretatiom

which produce uncertainty or insecurity are to be avoidedm
are distinctions based on "a course of reasoning too
unsubstantial and
human action."

~oo

finely drawn for the regulation of

76 Am Jur 2d, Statutes §261 at 430, e.g.,

Id., §269 at 436.

The opinion of Justice Hall would have

Logan remake the entire municipal code on whether a
particular function is "executive" or "legislative."

Mister

are likely to be frequent and litigation is the only final
recourse for determinations.
The dangers of disregarding the cannons of
statutory construction and basing a decision on unsworn
allegations of individual legislators are manifest,

First,

as the treatises express it
statutes are considered to have been enacted
with a view to their interpretation according
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-25to the settled maxims and principles
of statutory construction.
76 Am Jur 2d Statutes §142 at 349.

The legislature cannot

enact its will if the court presumes its enactments are not
according to the cannons of interpretation.

Second, there

is a high probability for error in making such conjectures
aliunde.

Error that is actual and palpable herein not merely

possible.
The opinion itself is not true to its own conclusions.

That is its method of interpreting the allocation

of powers in a legislative-executive-judicial, separated
powers government is not consistent with the method of
interpretation used in federal and state models:
In considering the nature of any government,
it must be remembered that the power existing
in every body politic is an absolute depotism;
in constituting a government, the body politic
distributes that power as it pleases and in
the quantity it pleases, and imposes what checks
it pleases upon its public functionaries. The
natural and necessary distribution of that
power, with respect to individual security, is
into legislative, executive, and judicial
departments.
It is obvious, however, that every
community may make a perfect or imperfect
separation and distribution of that power at
its will.
16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional law §210 [footnotes omitted].
That is, that the separation of powers concept does not say
which powers are to be separated to each body but merely that
they are to be separated.
The courts have perceived the necessity of
avoiding a narrow construction of a state
constitutional provision for the division of
the powers of government into three distinct
departments, for it is impractical to vi~w ~he
provision from the standpoint of a doctrinaire.
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-2616 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law §214.

Indeed Respondents

contend that is exactly what the opinion of Justice Hall does.
it devises "doctrinaire" definitions of "executive" and
"legislative" and then demands the entire remaking of the
Municipal Code on that basis.
Indeed, the rules of interpretation with respect

~

allocations of power in the federal and state models are not
followed or even alluded to in the opinion of Justice Hall:
In accordance with the doctrine that the state
constitution is not a grant of power, but only a
limitation, as far as the legislature is concerned,
it is a recognized principle of cons ti tutiorial law.
that except where limitations have been imposed by
the federal or state constitution, or by the valid
treaties and acts of Congress, the power of a
state legislature is unlimited and practically
absolute; it extends to any subject within the
scope of civil government, . . . . a state
legislature does not act under enumerated or grant'
powers, but rather under inherent powers, restrl~
only by the provisions of the constitution. If
limitations upon the exercise of the lawmaking
,
function are not found in the cons ti tut ion, they de
not exist, except insofar as all cons ti tut ions may I
be said to be limited.
As a rule, therefore, and
speaking generally, a legislature may do what the I
state and federal constitutions do not prohibit.
So long as no constitutional limits are exceeded,
the legislative will is supreme and must be obe~ed
by all other departments of the government.
The powers of the other two departments are not~
extensive.
The reason is that, unlike the lawmak1;.
power, the power of the executive and judicial
dpeartments in a state government is a grant, nQU.
limitation, and those two coordinate departments o:,
government can therefore exercise only the poweM
conferred upon them by the constitution ..
16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law §228 [footnotes omitted,
emphasis added].
It has been said that the executive power is mo"
limited than legislative powers, extending merelY
to the details of carrying into effect laws
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-27-

enacted by the legislature as they may be interpreted by the courts, the legislature having the
power, except where limited by the constitution
itself, to stipulate what actions executive
officers shall or shall not perform.
76 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law §216 [footnotes omitted, emphasis
added].

These principles are too well known and followed to

be subject to any question.
Constitution Law §228.

See cases cited in 16 Am Jur 2d,

Corpus Juris Secundum summarizes the

rules succinctly:
[T]he legislative department has all power not
expressly denied to it or given to another
branch of the government, and that wherever
the legislative power of a government is undefined it includes the judicial and executive
attributes, and that so great is the scope and
extent of this authority that, in the absence
of constitutional restrictions, the department
wielding it might with comparative ease absorb
within itself all the functions of the state.
It is the predominant branch of the government,
and in the absence of express limitations, the
extent of its power cannot be definitely stated.
16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law §106 at 296~ [emphasis added].
The application of these rules of interpretation
based on federal and state models is that the municipal
council (legislative body) has all those powers and duties not
given the Mayor (executive branch).

Further that these powers

are separate and neither entity can interfere with the other's
exercise of power given or remaining in its sphere.

The opinion

of Justice Hall is methodologically opposite, it determines
that the "executive" shall by mere use of that word be deemed
to have any and all functions meeting the opinion's own skewed
definition of "executive."

As a result of this cankered

method all power allocations existing in municipal government
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-28are to be nullified and reconstructed.

The opinion is not tri:

to its own method--if it wishes to slavishly apply federal
and state models then let them be applied well.
Any idea that the Congress of the United States

~

the Legislature of the State of Utah has merely "pure
legislative

~owers"

is palpably erroneous.

This is most

clearly elucidated in decisions and discussions of delegabilit
where the distinction is critical:
The general doctrine as to the inalienability of
the lawmaking function applies to the federal
government.
Congress cannot delegate to any
other body its strictly legislative powers.
As has already been indicated, the rule of
nondelegability is applicable to legislative
powers only; the rule does not bar Congress or
other legislatures from delegating such of
their powers as are not legislative in nature.
Thus,the rule is that in order that a court may
be justified in holding a statute unconstitional
as a delegation of legislative power, it must
appear that the power involved is purely legislative in nature--that is, one appertaining
exclusively to the legislative department.
16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law §§241, 242.
omitted].

[footnotes

Given the wide range of delegation, the numerous

powers of a legislative body which are not "legislative in
nature" is evident.

For example, the Utah State Legislature

has delegated its powers to buy, sell and exchange real
to a State Land Board, executive officers, etc.

pro~M

What is

happening is that a power not legislative in nature but
confided to the legislative body is being delegated pursuant '
to state law.

Of course, from time to time the Utah State

legislature may itself sell property on its authority, it
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-29having the entire authority to do so.

For example, in

1957 the State legislature directed the sale of legally
described lands to the Ute Indian Tribe reserving to itself
the minerals for the consideration of $2.50 an acre.

See

Section 65-18-83 U.C.A. 1953.
The weaknesses inherent in the opinion of Justice
Hall are well illustrated in its ruling on subdivisions:
When viewed in the light of the foregoing
concepts, [referring to definition of "executive"
and "legislative] the approval of subdivisions
in accordance with rules, policies, and procedures adopted by the legislative branch of
municipal government clearly appears to be a
function of the executive branch . . . .
In treating this issue, the trial judge, although
erroneously, had already determined that the
Council was generally vested with executive cowers
as would permit it to accrove subdivisions.
Consequently, he unnecessarily concerned himself
with the delegability of that power.
Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers,
the Council has no executive cowers to delegate and
it only exercised its legislative powers in adopting the ordinances which established the policies
to be executed by the Mayor in reviewing and
approving subdivisions.
In reaching this conclusion we are not unmindful of three separate
statutory provisions, separate from the Act, which
bear upon the approval and subsequent recordation
of subdivision plats in the office of the county
recorder.
One such provision provides for approval
by the planning commission and "legislative body"
and renders void any subdivision plat recorded in
the office of the county recorder which has not
been so approved; and another provides for approval
by the "legislative authority"; and the third
provides for approval "by its governing body, or by
some city or town officer for that purpose designated
by resolution or ordinance.''
The inconsistencies in the terminology of the
statutes in referring to the approving authority
is of some concern, but is by no means overpowering for the following reasons. The obvious purpose
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- 30of each of the statutes is to insure appropriate
approval of plats in order to preserve their
sanctity when recorded.
This is n0cessary to
protect those who acquire property within
the plats, since a properly recorded plat is
a prerequisite to valid title.
It is also
obvious that the statutes do not undertake to
vest any authority to approve plats but only to
recognize existing authority to approve and
require it to act.
Hence their use of the
terms "legislative body," "legislative authority,"
and "governing body" must be deemed to have been
in their c;eneric sense only and not an attempt to
designate the functions of any particular governing body.
It is also to be observed that the statutes are
of long duration, having been enacted before
strong-mayor and council-mayor forms of government were provided for, and when only traditional
forms of government were available.
Consequently,
it is not surprising that they contemplate only
a single governing body exercising both legislative
and executive powers.
It is interesting to
note, however, that even so, the statute that
appears in the "Plats and Subdivisions" chapter
of the Code recognizes that the governing body
may designate, by resolution or ordinance, a city
or town officer as the approving authority.
We conclude that the Mayor's approval of subdivision plats is an appropriate executive power
and that such is in compliance with statutory
requirements and prerequisites for the recording
thereof.
Opinion of Justice Hall at p.

7-8

[emphasis added].

The task imposed upon a city by this method of
interpretation should be clarified.

The entire Chapter 9 of

Title 10 governing zoning powers and sub di vision
uses the term "legislative body."

approvals

In the opinion of Justice

Hall the use of that term "legislative body" in Section
10-9-25 should be read in cities adopting the Optional Forms

Act as "the mayor" because that function in that statute
appears to be not purely "legislative."

So each usage of thr
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-31term "legislative body" in Chapter 9 must now be scrutinized
to see whether it means "the mayor" or truly the "legislative
body."
For example, Section 10-9-23 which provides:
From and after the time when the planning
commission of any municipality shall have
adopted a major street plan, the legislative
body may establish an official map of the
whole or any part or parts of the municipality
theretofore existing and established by law as
public streets.
Such official map may also
show the location of the lines of streets on
plats of subdivisions which shall have been
approved by the planning commission. The
legislative body may make, from time to time,
other additions to or modifications of the
official map by placing thereon the lines of
proposed new streets or street extensions,
widenings, narrowings, or vacations which have
been accurately surveyed and definitely located;
provided, however, that before taking any such
action the legislative body shall hold a
public hearing thereon and provided, further,
that such proposed addition to or modification
of the official map shall be submitted to the
planning commission for its approval, and in
the event of such commission's disapproval,
such addition or modification shall require the
favorable vote of not less than a majority of
the entire membership of the legislative
body . . . . .
If the "legislative body" term in Section 10-9-23 is interpreted to be legislative body and not mayor then it is that
body which establishes the "official map" and determines any
changes to the map by "new streets" "additions," "extensions,"
"widenings," "narrowings," etc.

Under the opinion of Justice

Hall the mayor would not have this authority, since the
adoption of a street plan is presumably an ordinance and
thus, "purely legislative."

But if the "legislative body"

does control adoption and changes in.the official map pursuant
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-32to Section 10-9-23 how can the mayor be considered the
repository of the authority to approve subdivisions which
inherently is the right to approve and accept new streets
into the city street plan?
Interestingly the application of the opinion of
Justice Hall leads to another curious result in application to
Section 10-9-25.
legislative body.
"the mayor."

The statute has two uses of the term
The opinion finds the second usage to be

The first usage refers to certifying the

map to the "legislative body."

offic~

Thus the opinion of Justice

Hall tends to the anomalous couclusion that within Section
10-9-25 the first use of "legislative body" means legislative
body and the second use of "legislative body" means the mayor.
And why, because there is language in the Optional Forms Act
loosely referring to an executive branch, a legislative

brM~ 1

and separation of powers.
The application of the opinion of Justice Hall to
subdivision and zoning laws reveals it to be contrary to:
numerous cannons of statutory construction.

[Rules of

construction are indicated by numerical reference to paragraph:
at pp.

of this brief.]
1.

It gives the mayor a power not enumerated

contrary to Rule #1.
2.

It interprets "executive" out of context then

applies the definition out of context to Chapter 9 term
"legislative body" contrary to Rule #2.

3.

It interprets words "legislative body" in t~

same statute to have different meanings contrary to Rule #3· '
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4.

It repeals and/or amends the entire use of

"legislative body" in Chapter 9 by the implications of the
imposed definition of "executive" contrary to Rule #6.

5.

It disregards the Rule #7 that statutes are

to be harmonized.
6.

It engenders great confusion and uncertainty

contrary to Rule #11.

7.

It draws distinctions "too unsubstantial and

too finely drawn to regulate human action," i.e., regulate
zoning, contrary to Rule #11.
The court's disregard for these rules in relation
to subdivision approval is a presumption that the state
legislature did not know the maxims of construction or and
that the legislature did not know that the entire zoning and
subdivision

were built on a power allocation to the

"legislative body.n
Further, the application of the accepted interpretations of federal and state power allocations reveals the
erroneous conclusions reached in the opinion of Justice Hall.
Those accepted interpretations wholly ignored with respect to
its discussion of subdivision approval are as follows:
1.

The legislative body has all powers not
granted to executive or judicial departments.

2.

Separation of powers is to be determined by
each body politic, there is no requirement
that certain powers be allocated to
certain branches.

3.

Divisions of power in separation of power
governments are not to be doctrinaire;
that is, they are to be divided by
allocation not definition.
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4.

The legislative body may stipulate,
except where limited, as to what the
executive may or may not do.

Interestingly the opinion of Justice Hall indicates
its ruling is not as to delegability, but shear executive
power.

That is, the municipal council has no power to

delegate and thus cannot even set controls on the use of that
power.

That is, the Mayor cannot be regulated for it is, in

the opinion of Justice Hall, an executive power; "We need not
concern ourselves and the trial judge "unnecessarily
himself with the delegability of that power."

concern~

Opinion of

Justice Hall at p. 7.
The application of the opinion of Justice Hall to
subdivision approval reveals its flaws;
the entire opinion and all its holdings.

flaws which pervade
It is neither

consistent with its own chosen models nor with accepted rules
of statutory construction.

CONCLUSION
The errors complained of if allowed to stand will
erect a monument of confusion to the rule of law, due process,
and will cause perpetual conflict in any municipality operatini
under the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act.

The

opinion of Justice Crockett should be adopted by the Court.
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Respectfully submitted,

Dfil:NES & DAINES
\

'
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I, WILLARD HALE GARDNER, BEING DULY SWORN ON OATH DO
DEPOSE AND SAY1
1.

'Ihat I am a member of the Utah House of Representatives

and have been since before 1974.

Further that I was actively involved

in the paesage of Senate Bill #179 in the 1975 Session, known as the
Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act.
2.

'Ihat my name appeared as Amicus Curiae in Supreme Court

No, 15498, Martindale v. Anderson.

Until July 28th, 1978, I was not

aware that my name was specifically being used but I do recall some
discussion concerning the case some time ago,

'lhe Brief of Amicus

Cuariae does not acurately represent my views concerning this municipal
form of government,

I.

I

I never recall being asked for my views nor was

I consulted concerning the contents of the Brief filed.

J.

'Ihat to my knowledge the sponsor of this legislation

never specifically discussed the intent of the legislation with specific
regard to real property transactions or approval of subdivisions with
regard to whether power was to be lodged with the municipal council or
mayor.

However the view that these powers are lodged solely with

the mayor appears contrary to every deliberation and consideration to
which I was privy during the preparation and passage of this legislation.
4.

With regard specifically to the purchase, sale and

exchange of real property my intent was and I believe the intent of
the legislature was that the municipal council have the authority and
poser of control.

'Ihe fulfillment of the plans and actual acts in

carrying out those powers could, of course, be delegated,

It is contrary

to any intent that I ever had that a mayor acting on his own authority
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the municipal council.

5.

'Ihat with regard to subdivision approval again it is

contrary to any legislative intent that I ever had or which I believe
the legislature ever had that the mayor possessed unilateral power
to appro;e or disapprove subdivisions.

'Ihis

~ain

is such a significant

and important decision in a municipality that it should not be left
to one man's determination but that such decisions should be made by
the legislative body elected by the people.

As to whether this

power is delegable or as to the appropriate procedure for delgation
I have no firm opinion.

6. With regard to the Act generally, it is my opinion that
all municipal statutes not modified directly by the Act would remain
applicable.

'Ihat is that for example in the powers given cities to

regulate by zoning those references to "legislative body" would be
to the municipal counail except where the Optional Forms Act

specifically changes that power allocation.

I do not believe that

the legislature intended to cause a city to embark on the task of
reducing every power given to cities into tight categories of
legislative and executive qualities and thereby

remak~n

the muncipal

code,

WILLARD HALE GARDNER

1

Residing at 1
Commission

;l. , . , . ;f/,;t~
expires
01 .piz;

Notary

Public

-

1
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IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF UTAH

LOYE E. MARTINDALE; DARWIN W.
LARSEN; CAROL W. CLAY; LOGAH
CITY, a municipal corporation;
and the MUNICIPAL COUNCIL of
Logan City,
Plaintiffs, Respondents
vs.

AFFIDAVIT ON
PETITION FOR REHEARING.

Mayor DESMOND L. ANDERSON;
City Attorney J. BLAINE
ZOLLINGER; City Auditor and
Budge Officer DUANE H. BECK.
Defendants, Appellants

STATE OF UTAH

)
SS.

County of Cache )
COMES NOW CHARLES BULLEN and being first duly sworn
on oath deposes and says:
1.

That I am at the present time a duly elected and

serving member of the Utah State Senate; and,
2.

That during the 1975 Session of the Utah Legislature,

I was a member of the Utah House of Representatives representing
Legislature District No. 58 which includes most of Logan City.
Since that time, I have continued in being elected State Senator
in District No. 25 in 1976.
3.

That since becoming a member of the Utah Legis-

lature, I have been familiar with the legislative action relative
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to so called "Optional Forms of Municipal Government" primarily
because of political initiatives with respect to such legislation
from groups and individuals promoting changes for the specific
benefit of Logan City; and,
4.

That I know that the Strong-Mayor Form of Optional

Municipal Government Act was in force and available to Logan City
if approved by the electorate between 1959 and 1975, and that
pursuant to said act a proposal of adoption was presented to
the voters of Logan City in referendum form in 1973 and the
majority of voters of Logan City rejected the Strong-Mayor
Optional Form of Municipal Government; and,
5.

That the Strong-Mayor Optional Form of Government

act was repealed by the legislature in its 1975 Session, that
I know that one of the primary political forces that implored
the legislature to repeal the act was the negative results of
the

1~73

referendum in Logan City reflecting substantial,

substantive objection of the Logan electorate to the Strong-Mayor
Optional Form of Government; and,
6.

That during the 1975 legislative session, various

proposals of Optional Forms of Municipal Government were
proposed including one HB 215 which I sponsored but later withdrew in favor of SB 179 sponsored by State Senator Karl Snow
and others, which became law.

In my opinion, all of the optional

forms presented intentionally did not contain the words "StrongMayor.

Such title and substance changes from the Strong-Mayor

Act were consciously designed to construct one or more Optional
Forms of Municipal Government available to all cities but which
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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{!~

corrected the preceived substantive objections of the Logan
electorate to the Strong-Mayor Form.

Thereafter, the same Logan

body electorate which had rejected the Strong-Mayor Form adopted
the Council-Mayor Form; and,
7.

That from my exposure of the legislative process

it was my distinct understanding that the Mayor under SB 179
had the exclusive authority to deal administratively with Department Heads and city employees, but that the Mayor could only
buy, sell or trade real property upon authorization and/or

{t~

direct~~

of the Council.

I also understood that matters such

as location of roads and streets as inherently involved in subdivision approvals and adoptive major road plans and long term
commitment of city services to new development were also within
the powers given to the council; and,
8.

It was my understanding of SB 179 that it did

propose to separate powers between the council and the Mayor.
That in separating the powers it was a distinct intentional
departure from the previous Commission-Mayor Form of Government.
I understood that the act provided generally for such division
on policy making or legislation and administrative or executive
lines as between the Council and Mayor respectively.

I under-

stood that these general terms were given express and specific
meaning by the act itself, which defined, quite apart from those
general designations, in terms directly applicable to muncipal
government under Utah law, which body had which powers.
9.

That as a member of the House Sifting Committee,

-3-
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1975 Session, in representing the desires of Logan City for
an Optional Form of Government, I was instrumental in referring
Senate Bill 179 to the House floor and causing its passage.
9.

I understand that this affidavit is given for the

purpose of evidencing general and specific legislative intent
with respect to the subject legislation on a petition for
rehearing before the Utah Supreme Court and that if I am given
the opportunity, I will testify and be subject to cross-examination on the statements contained in this affidavit and hereby
waive any priviledge that may be granted

to me to refrain from

testifying concerning the above or related matters.
SIGNED this

'3 \ ~):

day of July, 197 8.

CHARLES BULLEN
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this

s_r
~3/

day

of July, 1978.

Residing at:

L8fj1411tk&.

Commission exoires:1;/16/7C1

•
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I

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed, prepaid, two copies
of the following Brief of Petitioners, to the following:
Melvin E.
Steven W.
403 State
Salt Lake

Leslie, Esq.
Allred, Esq.
Capitol Building
City, UT 84114

J. Blaine Zollinger
Logan City Attorney
61 West 1st North
Logan, UT 84321
Calvin L. Rampton, Esq.
Suzanne Dallimore, Esq.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK &
McDONOUGH
800 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Councilman Claude J. Burtenshaw
61 West 1st North
Logan, UT 84321
this ~day of August, 1978.
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